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This paper proposes an assignment model where sorting occurs on attributes including both 
skills (Sattinger, 1979) and preferences (Tinbergen, 1956). The key feature of this model is 
that the wage function admits both jobs’ and workers’ attributes as arguments. Since this 
function is generically nonlinear (Ekeland et al., 2004), even under positive assortative 
matching, the correlation between the contribution of workers’ attributes to wages and that of 
jobs’ attributes can vary from -1 to 1 depending on the parameters of the model, i.e. 
preference, technology and the distribution of both sets of attributes. The paper discusses a 
closed form solution of the model, presents conditions under which nonadditive marginal 
utility and production function are nonparametrically identified using observations from a 
single hedonic market and proposes a nonparametric estimator. 
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Recent emerging empirical literature (e.g. Borghans et al., 2008) has shown the im-
portance of personality traits in economics and in particular for earnings (Bowles
et al., 2001 and Mueller and Plug, 2006). This literature shows that earnings are
related to personality traits like risk aversion or conscientiousness. One possible
explanation for these wage di⁄erentials would be that personality traits are linked
to preferences for certain jobs￿attributes so that the correlation between person-
ality and earnings re￿ ects compensating wage di⁄erentials for jobs disamenities.
Yet, another explanation would be that personality traits are linked to skills that
enhance productivity on the job and hence lead to higher wages. For instance, the
documented positive e⁄ect of conscientiousness on earnings could come about be-
cause conscientiousness enhances workers￿productivity or because in equilibrium,
more conscientious workers are mapped onto jobs whose attributes are associated
with negative intrinsic utility (tax controller) and hence require a wage compen-
sation.
The model presented in this paper is the ￿rst to allow sorting to occur simul-
taneously on skills and preferences. This assignment model is concerned with the
process by which heterogenous workers, characterized by a vector of attributes t
including both skills and preferences, are assigned to heterogenous jobs, charac-
terized by a vector of attributes z including both required skills and disamenities.
3This paper shows that in this type of assignment models, wages re￿ ect two com-
pensations that arise simultaneously, namely a compensation for the skills supplied
and a compensation for jobs￿disamenities. This implies that the wage function
takes both workers￿and jobs￿attributes as arguments, i.e. w(t;z). In this model,
an equilibrium is de￿ned by a mapping of workers￿attributes t onto jobs￿attributes
z, a function say t(z) or z(t), together with a wage function w(z;t) that depends
on both workers￿attributes and jobs￿attributes.
The fact that the wage function admits both workers￿and jobs￿attributes as
arguments has important implications for empirical applications and in particular
for two noteworthy segments. First, the model has implications for the estimation
of preference (technology respectively) parameters in hedonic models. Recently,
Ekeland et al. (2002 and 2004) and Heckman et al. (2009) have shown conditions
under which nonparametric identi￿cation of additive and nonadditive marginal
utility models of the Tinbergen class, where sorting occurs on preferences only,
is possible in a single hedonic market. Their identi￿cation strategy relies on the
￿rst order condition to utility maximization and builds on results from Matzkin
(2003) on nonparametric estimation of nonadditive random functions. Crucial in
this setting is the assumption that the slope of the wage function @w=@z, the left
hand side of the ￿rst order condition, is identi￿ed from data on wages, workers￿
attributes and jobs￿attributes.
4In the Tinbergen class of models assumed in Ekeland et al. (2004) and Heck-
man et al. (2009), wages depend only on z so that data on wages and z, i.e. dw=dz,
identify @w=@z. However, in the uni￿ed economy, where workers￿attributes in-
clude both preferences and skills, wages are given by the unknown function w(z;t)
and hence dw=dz = @w=@z+@w=@t￿t0(z). Without further assumptions, @w=@z is
not identi￿ed nonparametrically since for any value of t, the value of z is uniquely
determined by the mapping function z = z(t).
This paper shows conditions under which @w=@z is identi￿ed nonparametrically
and proposes a nonparametric estimator. First, it is shown that the mapping
function z(t) is identi￿ed nonparametrically using results from Matzkin (2003).
This is a generalization to the uni￿ed economy of Heckman et al.￿ s (2009) result
obtained for the Tinbergen class of models. Following the identi￿cation of z(t), a
method to nonparametrically identify @w=@z is proposed. This method relies on
imposing shape restrictions on the utility and production functions. In general,
the method requires that i) the production function is additive separable in (z;t￿i)
and ti, with t =< t￿i;ti >, where the contribution of ti is a known di⁄erentiable
function r(ti) and ii) ti is a scalar attribute in￿ uencing job satisfaction. Condition
i) insures that @w=@ti(= r0(ti)) is known. Condition ii) insures that z and hence
@w=@z vary with ti. When Conditions i) and ii) are met, @w=@z is identi￿ed from
data in a single hedonic market as @w=@z = 1=z0(t)(dw=dti ￿ r0(ti)). A special
5case is met when ti is a pure preference attribute, that is, ti a⁄ects utility but not
productivity, i.e. r0(ti) = 0 for all z and ti. Attribute ti is an exclusion restriction
in the equilibrium wage function w(z;t) since it does not a⁄ect productivity but
not in the equilibrium assignment z(t) since it matters for job satisfaction.
Second, the model contributes to the literature on earnings regressions using
matched employer-employee data, e.g. Abowd et al. (1999). This literature shows
that in an earnings regression on matched employee-employer panel data, while
both workers￿and ￿rms￿￿xed-e⁄ects correlate positively with measures of ￿rms￿
productivity, their correlation is very low or even negative. The uni￿ed hedonic
model presented in this paper o⁄ers a natural explanation for this puzzle. Since
sorting occurs on both skills and preferences, wages are function of both workers￿
attributes and jobs￿attributes. However, even when sorting exhibits positive as-
sortative matching, the model does not imply that the contribution of workers￿
attributes to wages correlates positively with that of jobs￿attributes. Both the
sign and magnitude of the correlation between workers￿and jobs￿￿xed-e⁄ects will
depend on the preference parameters, the technology parameters and the distrib-
ution of workers￿and jobs￿attributes.
For instance, suppose that a worker￿ s utility decreases with the distance be-
tween her own skills and the level of complexity of her job, as in Tinbergen (1956),
but workers￿skills and jobs￿complexity are complement in production, as in Sat-
6tinger (1979). From both Tinbergen (1956) and Sattinger (1979) we know that
in this economy more skilled workers will be assigned to more complex jobs in
equilibrium, i.e. positive assortative matching arises. From Sattinger (1979) we
know that the contribution of skills to wages is increasing in skills everywhere
on the support of skills.1 However, from Tinbergen (1956) we also know that
the contribution of job complexity to wages is only increasing in job complexity
(and hence in skills since there is positive assortative matching) in intervals of job
complexity where job complexity exceeds the skills of the worker matched to that
job. This means that if the distribution of skills dominates the distribution of jobs
stochastically at the ￿rst order, then the contribution of job complexity to wages
is decreasing in job complexity (skills) while the contribution of skills to wages
is increasing in skills. In this case, the correlation between both contributions is
negative even though equilibrium exhibits positive assortative matching.
Using the unidimensional quadratic-normal example, it is shown that one can
calibrate the uni￿ed hedonic model so as to generate data where the contribution
of workers￿attributes to wages and that of job attributes both correlate posi-
tively with ￿rms￿productivity but not with each other. Changing the distribu-
tion of attributes over time induces the type of mobility of workers across ￿rms
that is necessary to identify workers￿and ￿rms￿￿xed-e⁄ects in matched employer-
1It is implicitly assumed that almost all workers have positive skills and almost all jobs have
positive complexity. With normal distributions this is the case when the mean of each distribution
is positive and large enough relative to the variance.
7employee panel data set. It is shown that using this strategy for the unidimensional
quadratic-normal example, one can generate a panel data and estimate workers￿
and ￿rms￿￿xed-e⁄ects that both correlate with ￿rms￿productivity but not with
each other.
The remaining structure of the paper is as follows. The next section reviews the
related literature. Section 3 presents the uni￿ed model for the hedonic endowment
economy. Section 4 presents a closed form solution for the wage function in the
quadratic-normal setup. Section 5 discusses the implication of the model for the
identi￿cation of preference parameters in a single hedonic market as well as for the
literature on ￿rms￿and workers￿￿xed-e⁄ects in earnings regressions using matched
employer-employee data. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 Related literature
The model presented in this paper nests existing assignment models in the liter-
ature. This literature is divided into two distinct classes of models depending on
the nature of the process governing assignment. One class of models, led by Tin-
bergen (1956), focuses on the assignment of workers to jobs based on preferences.
Within this class of models, jobs￿attributes z are seen as disamenity and workers
derive intrinsic disutility from z. Although jobs with di⁄erent attributes are un-
equally productive, output at a job with attribute z does not depend on workers￿
8attributes t. Hence productivity is merely determined by jobs￿attributes and all
workers are equally productive at all jobs. In this class of models, workers select
jobs￿attributes to maximize their utility. The pricing function w(z;t) does not de-
pend on workers￿attributes but merely on jobs￿attributes, i.e. w(z;t) = w(z), and
is therefore interpreted as a compensating wage di⁄erential. As an example, the
preference class of models indicates that risk loving workers will tend to become
￿remen as they command lower compensations for the risks taken on the job, but
yet, assumes that risk loving workers would just make as good ￿remen as any other
(risk averse) worker. While this class of models explains wage formation due to
risk compensation, the model fails to explain wage formation due to productivity
di⁄erentials across workers.
In contrast, the second class of models, led by Sattinger (1979), focuses on the
assignment of workers to jobs based on skills. Jobs￿attributes are seen as produc-
tive capacities and workers derive no intrinsic (dis-)utility from z. Both workers￿
and jobs￿attributes matter for productivity. Workers with certain attributes are
more productive at certain jobs than others. In this class of models, workers select
jobs￿attributes to maximize their wage and the wage function w(z;t) does not
depend on jobs￿attributes but merely on workers￿attributes, i.e. w(z;t) = w(t).
For instance, the skills class of models indicates that conscientious workers will
tend to become tax controllers as conscientiousness is an important factor of pro-
9ductivity on the job, but yet, assumes that conscientious workers derive the same
disutility from being a tax controller as less conscientious workers. While this class
of models explains wage formation due to di⁄erential productivity across workers,
these models fail to explain wage formation due to preference compensation.
The model presented in this paper nests both Tinbergen￿ s and Sattinger￿ s mod-
els.2 Under the assumption that all jobs￿attributes lead to intrinsic disutility and
workers￿attributes do not a⁄ect productivity the model collapses to Tinbergen￿ s
model. Under the assumption that all workers￿attributes contribute to produc-
tivity and no job attributes lead to intrinsic disutility the model collapses to Sat-
tinger￿ s di⁄erential rents model.
There exist only few examples of closed form solutions for the hedonic price as
a function of attributes, i.e. w(z;t). The ￿rst was proposed by Tinbergen (1956).
Assuming that i) workers derive intrinsic disutility from all their attributes, ii) price
enters log linearly in the utility function, iii) intrinsic (dis-)utility is quadratic in
jobs￿attributes z, iv) the supply of products is exogenous (the hedonic endowment
economy model) and v) both workers and jobs￿attributes are normally distributed,
Tinbergen showed that the log of the equilibrium price is a function quadratic in
2Sattinger (1977) developed a compensating wage di⁄erential model where workers di⁄er in
terms of productivity and jobs in terms of the satisfaction workers receive from working at it, both
unidimensional. Workers and jobs attributes are encompassed in the de￿nition of job satisfaction
and cannot be distinguished from each other. Moreover, all jobs have similar productivity. There
is no complementarity between workers skills and jobs requirements.
10attributes z.3 Assuming i), ii￿ ), iii) and v) and relaxing iv) by allowing ￿rms to
produce job attributes and introducing production costs (the hedonic production
economy model), Epple (1984) provided a closed form solution for the hedonic
price function that is quadratic in z when production costs are also quadratic in
z. Sattinger (1979 and 1980) provided closed for solutions when jobs and workers
are di⁄erentiated along a single attribute (skills demanded and supplied) assuming
that workers derive no intrinsic disutility from the level of skills demanded by their
job, i.e. maximize their wage. This skills attribute a⁄ects productivity but does
not provide intrinsic utility. The pricing function of interest in this model is the
wage as a function of workers￿skills. Since skills provide no intrinsic disutility and
merely a⁄ect production, sorting in this model occurs on productive attributes
rather than preference attributes as in Tinbergen and Epple. Sattinger￿ s (1980)
closed form solutions for the wage function are obtained when the distribution of
jobs and workers are Pareto, production is multiplicative in attributes (i.e. Cobb-
Douglas) and utility depends on wages only. This last assumption is characteristic
of the di⁄erential rents model that precludes compensating wage di⁄erential for
intrinsic disutility derived from the type of jobs.
A closed form solution for the uni￿ed model is proposed in section 4 of this
paper. This solution is derived when workers￿and jobs￿attributes are normally
3In fact, replacing ii) by ii￿ ) price enters linearly in the utility function, the level of the
equilibrium price would be quadratic in z.
11distributed and intrinsic disutility is quadratic in jobs￿attributes and productivity
is quadratic in workers￿attributes.
Finally, this paper relates to the general literature on hedonic models and not
only on that segment focussing on the labor market. For instance, Epple￿ s exten-
sion of Tinbergen￿ s endowment economy to a production economy was originally
written in a consumer/producer context, not a worker/￿rm context. In the con-
sumer/producer model, the restriction that consumers￿attributes do not a⁄ect
the production of goods does not at ￿rst sight seem to be too strong. However,
the generalization proposed in Appendix 3 of this paper is also relevant in that
case. Think for instance of an economy where ￿rms are endowed with a vector
of attributes y. In this economy, to produce good z, ￿rms need to hire a ￿xed
number of workers, one and only one worker for simplicity. Suppose further that
the attributes of that worker, say t0, matter in the production process so that the
costs (pro￿ts) of producing good z depend on t0. Firms need now to optimize not
only on z but also on t0.
123 The uni￿ed hedonic endowment economy model
3.1 Setup
Consider a static labor market where workers match one-to-one with ￿rms. Let
each ￿rm be endowed with a single machine. The supply of machines is therefore
assumed exogenous to the model,4 and the assumption that workers and ￿rms
match one-to-one therefore means that to produce output each machine must be
operated by one and only one worker. Let a machine be characterized by a vector of
attributes denoted by z 2 Rnz. To ￿x ideas, machines attributes could be the level
of physical strength involved in operating the machine, the level of intellectual
complexity involved, the level of noise generated by the machine, the degree of
risks taken while operating the machine, etc. Let fz(z) and Fz(z) be the PDF
and CDF of z respectively and let Fz be absolutely continuous with respect to
Lebesgue measure.
Similarly, suppose that workers are endowed with a vector of attributes t 2 Rnt.
These attributes could refer to cognitive ability such as physical strength, intel-
lectual ability but also personality traits such as conscientiousness, risk aversion
etc.. Let the distribution of t be exogenous and let ft(t) and Ft(t) be its PDF and
4The assumption that ￿rms are endowed with a machine z can be released by supposing that
￿rms are endowed with a vector of attributes y (investments capacity, managers￿attributes etc.)
and ￿produce￿their machine z. The distribution of machines is then endogenous to the model.
This case corresponds to the hedonic production economy and is dealt with in Appendix 2. The
main results of the paper remain unchanged but the mechanic of the model simpli￿es signi￿cantly
by assuming machines are endowed.
13CDF respectively and let Ft be absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue
measure.5
In contrast to Tinbergen (1956), Epple (1984), Ekeland et al. (2002 and 2004)
and Heckman et al. (2009), the model does not require workers￿attributes to be
non productive. Let the output of each machine depend on its own attributes but
also on the attributes of the worker operating this machine. Let p(z;t) be a twice
di⁄erentiable continuous function indicating the units of output produced by the
pair (z;t). An attribute i is not a productive attribute if and only if
@p(z;t)
@ti = 0
for all z and t. Note that some attributes may be productive at some jobs but
not at others. While skills of di⁄erent types will clearly a⁄ect productivity, some
preferences may also a⁄ect productivity, for instance, a risk averse person might
also tend to operate a machine slower, conscientious workers may take better care
of their machine, etc...
Let w(z;t) be the wage of a worker with attributes t when assigned to a ma-
chine with attributes z and let r(z;t) be the rents of a ￿rm owning machine with
attributes z when employing a worker with attributes t. Note that, by de￿nition,
product is exhausted so that p(z;t) ￿ w(z;t) = r(z;t).
5It should be noted here that the mass of workers is assumed to be equal to the mass of
￿rms. The model could be accommodated to allow for di⁄erent masses and would inevitably
lead to unemployed workers or vacancies in equilibrium depending on whether the mass of workers
exceeds that of ￿rms. Although assignment models o⁄er an interesting structure to analyze which
agents are kept out of the market by the equilibrium pricing, the primary aim of this paper is
to analyze wage formation when workers￿attributes are both skills and personality traits. The
assumption of equal mass does not seem to be restrictive with respect to this aim.
14In contrast to Sattinger (1979), the model does not require that jobs￿attributes
do not a⁄ect intrinsic disutility. Assume a quasilinear utility function u(z;t) =
w(z;t)￿j(z;t) where consumption equals wages w(z;t) by assuming no unearned
income. Let j(z;t) be a continuous twice di⁄erentiable function capturing job
dissatisfaction. The function j could take the speci￿c form proposed by Tinbergen
(1956), j(z;t;A) = 1
2 (z ￿ t)
0 A(z ￿ t) where A is a positive de￿nite matrix of
parameters. A job attribute i does not provide intrinsic utility if and only if
@j(z;t)
@zi = 0 for all z and t.
3.2 Equilibrium
De￿nition 1 An equilibrium is a wage function w(z;t) and a mapping function
t(z) so that i) ￿rms￿supply of machines with attributes z equals workers￿demand
for machines with attributes z everywhere on the support of z, ii) workers maximize
utility and iii) ￿rms maximize rents.6
Utility maximizing workers seek for a machine with attributes z so that:


















Let z(t) denote the implicit function that solves Equation 1 for z given j(:;:)
and w(:;:). This function indicates the optimal machine a worker with attributes
t chooses given job dissatisfaction j(:;:) and the shape of the wage function and
in particular the wage di⁄erential at z.






























Let t(z) denote the implicit function that solves Equation 2 for t given j(:;)
and w(:;:). This function indicates the optimal choice of a worker for a ￿rm with
machine z given productivity p(:;:) and the shape of the wage function and in
particular the di⁄erential at t.
It is important to note that the ￿rst order conditions determine the slopes
of the equilibrium wage function while the second order conditions restrict the
curvature. However, nothing is known about the cross-partial derivative. This
suggests that if there exists a solution for the wage function, this solution will not
be unique. All functions satisfying the ￿rst and second order conditions but with
17di⁄erent cross-partial derivatives will also be solutions.7
Note that if the equilibrium is pure,8 the two mapping functions z(t) and t(z)
are invertible. We therefore have the restriction t￿1(t) = z(t).
For an equilibrium allocation to be reached, the supply of machines with at-
tributes z should be equal to workers￿demand for machines with attributes z for








Equilibrium will be reached by choosing the right shape for the function w(z;t)
and in particular the right di⁄erentials at t and z. Workers and ￿rms will partic-
ipate if their wage and rents are larger than their reservation levels. To close the
model, the usual assumption is to ￿x a reservation value for the utility, say u and
rent r so that u and r must be larger than their respective thresholds.
3.3 Existence, Uniqueness and Purity
The results on the existence, uniqueness and purity of equilibrium in the uni￿ed
hedonic model presented below build on Chiappori et al. (2009). Chiappori et al.
7See Section 3.3.
8Conditions for purity are given in Section 3.3.
18(2009) show equivalence results between hedonic models with quasi linear utility,
stable matching models with transferable utilities and optimal transportation lin-
ear programming problem. These equivalence results allow Chiappori et al. (2009)
to draw from the optimal transportation linear programming literature and prove
the existence, uniqueness and purity in a great generality of hedonic models of the
Tinbergen class.
Following this line of thought, write the optimal transport problem associated
to the uni￿ed hedonic model above as follows. Let an assignment be de￿ned as
a measure ￿(z;t) on Rnz ￿ Rnt whose marginals are Fz and Ft. Note that the
measure ￿ corresponds to the mapping function introduced earlier t = t(z). Also,
let s(z;t) ￿ p(z;t) ￿ w(z;t) + w(z;t) ￿ j(z;t) = p(z;t) ￿ j(z;t) be the surplus of
the pair worker t and ￿rm z.























V (z) + U(t) ￿ s(z;t) 8(z;t) 2 R
nz ￿ R
nt
where U(t) and V (z) can be seen as the payo⁄of worker t and ￿rm z respectively.
It is important to note that all that matters in the optimal transportation
linear programming problem is the surplus function s(z;t) and the distributions
of attributes Ft(t) and Fz(z). How this surplus is formed (s(z;t) = p(z) ￿ j(z;t)
in the Tinbergen class studied by Chiappori et al., 2009, and s(z;t) = p(z;t) ￿
j(z;t) in the uni￿ed class) and whether the transfer is w(z) or w(z;t) respectively
does not matter. This means that from the perspective of the primal and dual
program, whether one considers the Tinbergen class or the uni￿ed class of models
is irrelevant. However, the distinction is fundamental in the identi￿cation of how
the surplus is built up, i.e. productivity and preferences.
There are two important results available from the optimal transport literature
for the existence, uniqueness and purity of an equilibrium in the uni￿ed hedonic
20model. The ￿rst important result is that:
Solution 2 If the surplus function s(:;:) is upper semicontinuous, then a maxi-
mum in the primal program is attained so that an equilibrium allocation ￿ exists.
In the uni￿ed hedonic model outlined in the previous section, the assumptions
of continuity and twice di⁄erentiability of the production function and job dis-
satisfaction function carry over to s(:;:). Since these properties satisfy ￿are in
fact stronger than￿ the upper semicontinuous hypothesis required in the theorem,
we conclude that an equilibrium assignment ￿(z;t) exists in the uni￿ed hedonic
economy.
In addition, if the surplus function s(:;:) satis￿es the twisted-buyers/sellers

















then the equilibrium assignment ￿(z;t) is unique and pure, i.e. the mapping
function t(z) is strictly monotonic ￿see Theorem 4.11 in Chiappori et al. (2009)￿.
The second important result from the optimal transport literature reads as:






Rnt U(t)dFt(t) if and only if ￿ solves the primal program and (U;V ) solves the dual
program.
This result can be used to prove the existence of an equilibrium price function in
the uni￿ed hedonic model. Since Chiappori et al. (2009) focussed on the Tinbergen
class of hedonic models with p(z;t) = p(z) and w(z;t) = w(z), a formal proof for
the existence of an equilibrium price function w(z;t) in the uni￿ed hedonic model
is proposed below.
Proof. Let w : Rnz ￿ Rnt ! R satisfy:
U(t) + j(z;t) ￿ w(z;t) ￿ p(z;t) ￿ V (z) (3)
The left hand side of this inequality is the minimum willingness of worker t to
accept job z while the right hand side is the maximum willingness of ￿rm z to pay
for worker t:
Take a feasible triple (￿;U;V ) and suppose that (U;V ) solves the dual program
so that V (z) + U(t) ￿ s(z;t) = p(z;t) ￿ j(z;t). Rearranging obtains:
U(t) + j(z;t) ￿ p(z;t) ￿ V (z) for (z;t) 2 R
nz ￿ R
nt (4)




Rnz V (z)dFz(z) +
R






(V (z) + U(t))d￿(z;t)
since
R
Rnz d￿(z;t) = Ft(t) and
R
Rnt d￿(z;t) = Fz(z). This yields s(z;t) = V (z) +
U(t) for ￿￿almost every (z;t), that is for z = z(t). Consider a worker t￿ that is









￿) ￿ V (z
￿) (5)
From our choice of w(z;t) in Inequality 3 we haveU(t￿)+j(z;t￿) ￿ w(z;t￿) for
worker t￿ and z 2 Rnz and w(z￿;t) ￿ p(z￿;t) ￿ V (z￿) for ￿rm z￿ and all t 2 Rnt.
Rearranging and using Equation 5 obtains:
p(z
￿;t) ￿ w(z














￿) 8z 2 R
nz (7)
It follows that t￿ maximizes p(z￿;t) ￿ w(z￿;t) and z￿ maximizes w(z;t￿) ￿
j(z;t￿). Since the equalities in 6 and 7 hold for ￿￿almost every (z;t) and ￿ exists,
there exists a solution (￿;w) to the uni￿ed hedonic model.
Note however that the solution for w(:;:) is not unique. Suppose that the
23surplus function s(:;:) satis￿es the twisted-buyers/sellers condition (generalized
Spence-Mirrlees conditions). There exists a unique solution for the mapping func-
tion (a unique and pure solution that solves the primal program), say t = b t(z)
where b t is a monotonic function. Let b w(z;t) be a solution for w(z;t). The FOCs
yield:










Totally di⁄erentiating the FOCs with respect to z and rearranging yields (drop-





















since @2 b w
@t2 ￿
@2p
@t2 < 0 and @2 b w
@z2 ￿
@2j
@z2 < 0 from the SOCs.
It is easy to show that for all z 2 Rnz, one could change the value of @2 b w
@z@t,
@2 b w
@t2 and @2 b w
@z2 in such a way that the right hand sides of Equation 8 and 9 remain
24unchanged and the SOCs are still satis￿ed. This means that even though b t is
unique (and pure), the solution for the wage function is not unique.
4 Quadratic-normal example
4.1 The model
Let nz = nt = n and let workers￿attributes be normally distributed with mean
vector ￿t and variance-covariance matrix ￿t and let z be normally distributed
with mean vector ￿z and variance-covariance matrix ￿z. Suppose that, as in
Tinbergen (1956) job dissatisfaction is de￿ned as j(z;t;A) = 1
2 (z ￿ t)
0 A(z ￿ t),
where A is a positive de￿nite matrix of preference parameters. Suppose further
that productivity is given by p(z;t;E) = b0 + b0z + c0t + 1
2z0Bz + 1
2t0Ct + t0Dz
and where b0 is a constant, b and c are vectors and B, C and D are matrices
of parameters. The parameters contained in D indicate the extent to which the




The generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition will be satis￿ed as long as jD + Aj 6=
0. As long as jD + Aj 6= 0, equilibrium is pure for any distributions Ft and Fz
so that the mapping function t(z) is invertible with inverse z(t) ￿ t￿1(t). The
mapping function t(z) is linear when the distributions of t and z are normal.
25The ￿rst order conditions read now as:9
@w(z;t)
@z
= A(z ￿ t)
@w(z;t)
@t
= c + Ct + Dz
It is now easy to see that the ￿rst order conditions yield linear mapping of jobs￿
attributes on workers￿attributes if and only if
@w(z;t)
@t is linear in t and
@w(z;t)
@z is
linear in z. This, in turns, implies that the equilibrium wage function is quadratic
and reads as:10











9The second order conditions are trivial and given by:
@2w(z;t)




10We implicitly assume that the wage function is additive separable in z and t. Although
including the cross term z0￿t in the wage equation would still produce linear mapping functions,
the parameters of the wage function would not be identi￿ed unless we impose ￿ = 0 where 0
is a matrix ￿lled with 0.
26Using equation 10 in equations 1 and 2 respectively and rearranging yields:
￿ + (￿ ￿ A)z = ￿At (11)
￿ ￿ c + (￿ ￿ C)t = Dz (12)
These are linear functions and the reduced form solution will be of the form
t = ￿0 + ￿1z or z = ￿￿
￿1
1 ￿0 + ￿
￿1
1 t. Plugging t = ￿0 + ￿1z into 11 yields
￿ = ￿A￿0 and ￿ = A(I ￿ ￿1). Plugging z = ￿￿
￿1
1 ￿0 + ￿
￿1
1 t into Equation 12
yields ￿ = c ￿ D￿
￿1
1 ￿0 and ￿ = C + D￿
￿1
1 .
As noted earlier by Tinbergen (1956) and Epple (1984), when attributes on
both sides of the labor market are normally distributed, linear mapping functions
of the form t = ￿0 + ￿1z equilibrate supply and demand. Indeed, the equilib-
rium condition ft(t)dt1dt2:::dtN = fz(z)dz1dz2:::dzN given normally distributed
attributes, is equivalent to equating the means, i.e. ￿t = ￿0 + ￿1￿z and equating
the variances, i.e. ￿t = ￿0
1￿z￿1.
To ￿nd the solution for ￿0 and ￿1, ￿rst note that ￿t = ￿0
1￿z￿1 = (￿￿1)
0 ￿z (￿￿1).
There are therefore two solutions to this equilibrium condition, one with positive
assortative matching ￿1 > 0 and one with negative assortative matching ￿1 < 0.
These two solutions however will give rise to di⁄erent total surplus. The one that
27maximizes total surplus will prevail. If workers￿and jobs￿attributes are globally
complements (substitutes) in surplus, i.e. D + A > 0, then total surplus will be
maximized by mapping higher t with higher (lower) z, i.e. ￿1 > 0 (< 0). The
solution for ￿0 and ￿1 is:11
















￿￿1 if D + A > 0
















￿￿1 if D + A < 0








1 = I where I is the identity
















1￿z. Pre-multiply both sides of this
equation by ￿
￿1









If D + A > 0, the equilibrium wage function has for parameters:
11Note that the power p, p 2 R, p 6= 0, of a square matrix A of size n ￿ n is obtained as
ApX = Xdiag(￿) where X is a matrix of size n ￿ n formed of the n eigenvectors of A and ￿ is
the vector containing the corresponding eigenvalues. If in addition A is symmetric, then X is
orthogonal so that X0X = XX0 = I and, post-multiplying both sides by X0, the result simpli￿es
to Ap = Xdiag (￿)
p X0. The matrix Ap will be real if and only if all eigenvalues ￿ are real and
strictly positive that is if and only if A is positive de￿nite. Since ￿t and ￿z are symmetric, the














































































































The constant ￿0 is not identi￿ed. To close the model, the usual assumption
(see Ekeland et al. (2002 and 2004), Heckman et al. (2009) and Sattinger (1979)
among others) is to ￿x a reservation value for the utility, say u and rent r so that
u and r must be larger than their respective thresholds.
To summarize, we have shown that the equilibrium parameters of the wage
29function ￿, ￿, ￿ and ￿ are retrieved from the distribution parameters of workers￿
and jobs￿attributes using the mapping function t(z) = ￿0 + ￿1z where ￿1 is
identi￿ed by the variances and covariances of workers￿and jobs￿attributes only
and ￿0 is identi￿ed from the means of workers and jobs￿attributes and from ￿1.
The second order coe¢ cients of the wage function ￿ and ￿ depend only on the
matrix of variances and covariances of workers￿and jobs￿attributes. The ￿rst
order coe¢ cients ￿ and ￿ depend on the matrix variances and covariances and the
means of workers￿and jobs￿attributes.
To illustrate the model, we programmed the closed form solution of the uni-
dimensional quadratic-normal model in Mathematica. For a given set of parame-
ters, this program illustrates the equilibrium with a panel of three graphics. These
graphics represent 1) the equilibrium mapping function in the (z;t) plan, 2) the
equilibrium compensation for skills (i.e. the contribution of workers￿attributes to
wages) and the equilibrium compensation for jobs disamenities and 3) the distribu-
tion of workers￿and jobs￿attributes. We used the command Manipulate to enable
the user to visualize instantaneously the impact of changing structural parameters
of the model on the equilibrium through these three graphics.12 As an example,
Figure 6 was generated for ￿z = 1, ￿t = 4, ￿z = 1, ￿t = 0, and c = 10, C = ￿1,
D = 3 and A = 3.
12This program is available from the author upon request.
304.2 Relations to Tinbergen (1956) and Sattinger (1979)
Tinbergen (1956), Epple (1984) and Ekeland et al. (2002 and 2004) consider the
case where workers￿attributes do not contribute to production, i.e.
@p(z;t;E)
@t = 0
for all t and z, so that the ￿rst order condition to rents maximization in equation 2
indicate no wage di⁄erentials across workers￿attributes. In the quadratic-normal
example, this condition is met when D = C = 0 where 0 is a matrix ￿lled with
zeros, c0 = 0, so that equation 12 yields ￿ = C = 0 and ￿ = c = 0. Since D = 0 ,
the generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition for pure equilibrium is now satis￿ed for
jD + Aj 6= 0, the equilibrium will be pure in Tinbergen￿ s model only if jAj 6= 0.
The model proposed above admits Sattinger￿ s di⁄erential rents model as a
special case. This is the case when t and z are unidimensional and z carries no
intrinsic disutility so that
@j(z;t;A)
@z = 0 for all z and t or A = 0 in the quadratic-
normal example. From equation 2 (equation 11 respectively in the quadratic-
normal example) we then have ￿ = (A =) 0 and ￿ = 0 so that the wage function
depends merely on t. As soon as t is loaded with intrinsic disutility, A 6= 0 , the
slope of the rents function increases and the increase is more pronounced for higher
z. Again, since A = 0 , the generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition is satis￿ed if
jD + Aj 6= 0.
315 Implications for empirical applications
5.1 Identi￿cation and estimation in a single hedonic mar-
ket
5.1.1 Identi￿cation
Since the seminal work by Rosen (1974), the traditional approach to estimate
preference parameters, the function j(z;t),13 has consisted of two steps. In the
￿rst step, using market data on wages and jobs￿attributes, one estimates the wage
function applying the functional form that ￿ts best the data. In the second step,
one uses the ￿rst order condition in Equation 1 together with the marginal wage
derived from the ￿rst step, i.e.
dw(z)
dz , to recover preference estimates of j(z;t).
Early literature by Brown and Rosen (1982), Epple (1987), Bartik (1987) and
Kahn and Lang (1988) has argued that j(z;t) cannot be identi￿ed in a single
hedonic market unless an arbitrary nonlinear marginal utility is assumed. Recently,
Ekeland et al. (2002 and 2004) have shown that nonlinearity is a generic feature
of the hedonic model, not an arbitrary choice, and Ekeland et al. (2002 and 2004)
and Heckman et al. (2009) have provided conditions under which nonparametric
identi￿cation of additive and nonadditive hedonic models of the Tinbergen class
is possible in a single hedonic market.
13All techniques below apply also to the estimation of productivity parameters by symmetry.
32These conditions build on results from Matzkin (2003) on nonparametric esti-
mation of additive and nonadditive random functions. All the results from Ekeland
et al. and Heckman et al. crucially depend on the assumption that dw
dz identi￿es
@w
@z . In the Tinbergen class of models, where wages depend only on z, identi￿cation
of @w
@z follows by assumption, dw
dz = @w
@z . However, in the uni￿ed economy, wages are
given by the unknown function w(z;t) so that dw
dz = @w
@z + @w
@t t0. Without further
assumptions, @w
@z is not identi￿ed nonparametrically since for any value of t, the
value of z is uniquely determined through the mapping function z = z(t).
Since all the identi￿cation results presented in Heckman et al. follow once @w
@z
is identi￿ed, this paper focuses on the identi￿cation of @w
@z and refers the reader
to Heckman et al. for identi￿cation results of j(z;t) once @w
@z is identi￿ed. The
method proposed to identify @w
@z relies on shape restrictions on the production
function p(z;t).
Following Ekeland et al. and Heckman at al., assume that z is a scalar and t =<
to;tu > where to is a vector of observed attributes and tu is a scalar unobserved
(to the econometrician) attribute. Assume further that tu is independent of to.
The identi￿cation method requires ￿rst an identi￿cation of the mapping function
z = z(to;tu). Lemma 4 is a generalization of the identi￿cation proof provided in





@z@tu < 0 (or > 0), the mapping function z =
33z(to;tu) is identi￿ed in the uni￿ed hedonic model.
Proof. See Appendix 1:
Once the mapping function z(to;tu) is identi￿ed, we can proceed to the identi-
￿cation of @w
@z . The next theorem shows that imposing some shape restrictions on
the production function p(z;t) allows us to identify @w
@z .
Theorem 5 Let there be at least one attribute to







and ii) p(z;t) = q(z;to
￿i;tu) + r(to
i) where r(:) is a known di⁄erentiable function.
Then for any (z;to;tu), the function @w
@z is identi￿ed.






















Moreover, from lemma 4, z0
to
i is identi￿ed. Is z0
to
i 6= 0? Consider the ￿rst order




@z = 0. Totally
di⁄erentiating with respect to to





















i 6= 0 we have z0
to

















An important special case is met when r(to
i) is a constant. This occurs when
to




i) = 0 for all z and to
i. This means
that to
i plays the role of an exclusion restriction in the wage equation. Attribute
to
i is an argument of the mapping function z(:) but not of w(:;:).
5.1.2 Estimation
Since the estimation results presented in Heckman et al. (2009) follow once we
have estimated @w
@z , this paper focuses on the estimation of @w
@z and refers the reader
to Heckman at al. (2009) for the estimation of j(z;t). To present the problem in
terms of random functions, let W, T o, Z be the observable variables of our model
and let T u be the unobservable variable. All variables are of dimension 1 except
T o that has dimension of at least 1. Let our model be W = w(Z;(T o;T u)) where
w is an unknown function continuous in Z and (T o;T u) respectively. The function
w is assumed to belong to the set of functions derived from the uni￿ed economy
35outlined above. Let FTu(:) be the distribution of T u and let FW;Z;To(:;w0;F 0
Tu) be
the joint distribution of the observable variables when w = w0 and F 0
Tu = FTu.
Assume that T u is independent of T o. Our data consist of a sample of N draws of
W, Z and T o from a single hedonic market.
To estimate @w
@z , we need ￿rst to estimate the mapping function. From the
proof of Lemma 4 we know that z(to;tu) is strictly increasing in its last argument




















The ￿rst equality follows by the de￿nition of FTu, the second by the indepen-
dence of T o and T u, the third by the monotonicity of z(to;:) and the fourth by the
de￿nition of FZjTo=to.
Suppose we know FTu, since F
￿1








Suppose instead that we normalize the mapping function so that for some t
o
and all tu we have z(t
o;tu) = tu. From Equation 21, we have FTu(tu) = FZjTo=t
o(tu)
and we therefore identify the distribution of T u from the distribution of Z condi-
tional on T o = t
o. The expression of the function z is now given by noting that
FZjTo=to(z(to;tu)) = FTu(tu) = FZjTo=t
o(z(t
o;tu)). The ￿rst equality follows from
the monotonicity of z(to;:) in its last argument and the second holds from the











Estimates of z are obtained by replacing the true distributions F by their kernel
estimators b F following the de￿nitions provided in Matzkin (2003) or in Heckman
et al. (2009), in the above equalities. Denote b z(to;tu) the estimated mapping
function. Theorem 5 suggests the following estimator c @w
@z of @w





















i is the observed wage di⁄erential as to
i changes and using the known
function r to calculate r0.
5.2 Literature on matched employer-employee data
This model makes interesting predictions with respect to the empirical literature
estimating earnings functions using matched employer-employee panel data, e.g.
Abowd et al. (1999). This literature typically ￿nds that while both workers￿and
￿rms￿￿xed-e⁄ects positively correlate with measures of ￿rms￿productivity, the
correlation between the two components of wages is low or even negative. While
Shimer￿ s (2005) unidimensional assignment model with coordinative frictions could
generate low or even negative correlation if frictions are large enough,14 the uni￿ed
model presented above predicts that a frictionless economy could also be char-
acterized by a low or negative correlation between the contribution of workers￿
attributes to wages and that of jobs￿attributes even though both contributions
positively correlate with measures of ￿rms￿productivity and sorting exhibits pos-
14Recent empirical literature, e.g. De Melo (2009) and Lise, Meghir and Robin (2009), argues
that in equilibrium search models, correlations between the estimated employer and worker ￿xed
e⁄ects may be misleading.
38itive assortative matching. The key features of the uni￿ed hedonic model that
makes these predictions possible are: 1) that sorting occurs on both skills and
preferences and 2) the generic nonlinearity of the wage function (see Ekeland et
al., 2004).
To illustrate this result, consider the unidimensional quadratic-normal uni￿ed
hedonic economy. Let t be the skill level of workers and let z be the level of jobs￿
complexity. Let A > 0 so that workers have a preference for jobs of complexity
corresponding to their skills level. Let D > 0 so that workers￿skills complement
jobs￿complexity in production. It is further assumed that b, c, B, C and D are so
that production increases in t and in z for almost all pairs (z;t).







> 0, so that this economy is charac-
terized by positive assortative matching.
The production of a ￿rm holding job z when matched in equilibrium with








z2 where constp = b0 + c￿0 + C
2￿2
0. Using the solution ￿ =
￿A￿0, ￿ = A(I ￿￿1), ￿ = c￿D￿
￿1
1 ￿0 and ￿ = C +D￿
￿1
1 into Equation 10 and
after some simpli￿cations, obtains:














t2 is the wage contribution of work-
ers￿attributes and ￿(z) ￿ ￿￿0Az+ 1
2A(1￿￿1)z2 is the wage contribution of jobs￿
attributes.
Replacing t by ￿0 + ￿1z, the contribution of workers￿attributes to wages is
given by #(t(z)) = const# + ￿1 (c + ￿0C)z +
￿1












The three measures of interest are:
p(z;t(z)) = constp + ￿pz + ￿pz
2
#(t(z)) = const# + ￿#z + ￿#z
2
￿(z) = const￿ + ￿￿z + ￿￿z
2






, ￿# = ￿1 (c + ￿0C),
￿# =
￿1
2 (C￿1 + D), const￿ = 0, ￿￿ = ￿￿0A and ￿￿ = A
2(1 ￿ ￿1).
The question arises whether we can calibrate the parameters of the model so
that COV (#;p) ￿ 0, COV (￿;p) ￿ 0 and COV (#;￿) = 0 with the constraints
that A + D > 0 and hence ￿1 > 0. These three conditions read as:
40COV (#;p) ￿ 0 , ￿p￿#
￿z
V (z2)
+ (￿p￿# + ￿#￿p)
COV (z;z2)
V (z2)
+ ￿p￿# ￿ 0
COV (￿;p) ￿ 0 , ￿p￿￿
￿z
V (z2)
+ (￿p￿￿ + ￿￿￿p)
COV (z;z2)
V (z2)
+ ￿p￿￿ ￿ 0
COV (#;￿) = 0 , ￿￿￿#
￿z
V (z2)
+ (￿￿￿# + ￿#￿￿)
COV (z;z2)
V (z2)
+ ￿￿￿# = 0
Note ￿rst that one would not be able to satisfy these three conditions if #(t(z))
and ￿(z) were linear functions of z. For these conditions to be satis￿ed we need
#(t(z)) and ￿(z) to be nonlinear functions of z.
Note also that COV (z;z2) and V (z2) merely depend on ￿z and ￿z so that these
three conditions are governed by 10 free parameters, i.e. ￿z, ￿z, b, B, c, C, D, A,
￿1 (or ￿t once ￿z is given) and ￿0 (or ￿t once ￿z and ￿1 are given) suggesting
an in￿nity of solutions to the problem. However, it seems appropriate to restrict
the domain of the parameters to ensure absolute advantage of workers and ￿rms
that is 1) more skilled workers are more productive in all jobs, 2) more complex




= c + Ct + Dz > 0 for almost all t and z
, c > min




= b + Bz + Dt > 0 for almost all t and z
, b > min
z;t (￿Bz ￿ Dt)
Since z and t are normally distributed their support is the real line. For the
conditions above to be met for almost all t and z would require c and b to be
in￿nitely large. Instead, the conditions are imposed for all t within 2 standard
































￿1 if B < 0
1 else
As it turns out, even with these additional restrictions imposed on the pa-
rameters, one can easily calibrate the model so as to generate COV (#;p) ￿ 0,
42COV (￿;p) ￿ 0 and COV (#;￿) = 0. For instance, the calibration reported in
Table 1, shows, for a sample of 5000 ￿rms and workers, that COV (#;p) = 0:93,
COV (￿;p) = 0:40 and COV (#;￿) = 0:04.
One can even go further and generate not just one cross section of wage data
but several successive cross-sections. Provided there is enough mobility of workers
across ￿rms in the data, one would then be able to estimate ￿rms￿and workers￿
￿xed-e⁄ects using ￿rms￿and workers￿identity and wages as in Abowd et al. (1999).
The problem in hedonic models is to generate the kind of mobility necessary
to identify these ￿xed-e⁄ects. The solution is to either let the distribution of jobs
or the distribution of workers change over time. As either distribution changes
over time, the mapping function changes (remember that ￿1 =
q
￿t
￿z and ￿0 =
￿t ￿￿1￿z) which as the e⁄ect of shu› ing the identity (de￿ned by t) of the worker
assigned to each ￿rm (identity de￿ned by z) over time.
In the following example, ￿ve successive years of data are generated for an
economy of 5000 ￿rms and 5000 workers and the parameters are calibrated as in
Table 1. The required mobility is generated by successive increments of magnitude
0:05 in ￿t, i.e. ￿t increases from ￿0:04 to 0:16, keeping the variance of skills and
the distribution of jobs constant over time. In each cross section the assignment
of workers to ￿rms is de￿ned by t = ￿0 + ￿1z and wages are determined as
￿0 +#(t(z))+￿(z)+e where e a random error that follows a normal distribution.
43As is well-known in this literature, identi￿cation of workers￿and ￿rms￿￿xed-
e⁄ects is only possible within connected groups of workers and ￿rms (see Abowd
et al., 2002). Such a group contains all the workers who ever worked for any
￿rm in the group and all the ￿rms at which any worker in the group were ever
employed. Given the generated panel data, that contains information on wages,
￿rms￿identity and workers￿identity in ￿ve successive years, workers￿and ￿rms￿
￿xed-e⁄ects are estimated using the a2reg Stata command (see Ouazad, 2008) on
the largest connected group (selected using the a2group stata command). This
group contains 4706 di⁄erent ￿rms and 4706 di⁄erent workers observed on average
in 3.3 years.
Denote b # and b ￿ the estimated ￿xed-e⁄ects of workers and ￿rms respectively.
Estimation results show ￿rst that the estimated ￿rms￿and workers￿￿xed-e⁄ects





COV (￿;b ￿) = 0:68). Second, we ￿nd a negative correlation between the esti-




= ￿0:27 (true correla-
tion is COV (#;￿) = 0:01), whereas both sets of ￿xed-e⁄ects correlate positively




= 0:87 (where COV (#;p) = 0:94) and
COV (b ￿;p) = 0:21 (where COV (￿;p) = 0:23).
446 Conclusion
This paper uni￿es the two classes of models within the sorting literature. The
model nests both Tinbergen￿ s model of sorting on job preferences and Sattinger￿ s
model of sorting on productivity. Under the assumption that all jobs￿attributes
lead to intrinsic disutility but workers￿attributes do not a⁄ect productivity the
model collapses to Tinbergen￿ s model. Workers care about their job satisfaction
but are equally productive at all jobs. This means that the wage function does not
depend on workers￿attributes but merely on jobs￿attributes. Opposite to this,
under the assumption that all workers￿attributes contribute to productivity but
no jobs￿attributes lead to intrinsic disutility the model collapses to Sattinger￿ s
di⁄erential rents model. Workers do not care about job satisfaction, only about
their wage, but workers with di⁄erent attributes are unequally productive. This
means that the wage function does not depend on jobs￿attributes but merely
on workers￿attributes. In the more general case depicted in the unifying model,
workers do care about job￿ s satisfaction and productivity does depend on workers￿
attributes. As a result, the wage function has both workers￿and jobs￿attributes as
arguments. An example of closed form solution is provided when productivity and
job satisfaction are quadratic and attributes on both sides are normally distributed.
The model has implications for the estimation of preference (technology re-
spectively) parameters in hedonic models. Recently, Ekeland et al. (2002 and
452004) and Heckman et al. (2009) have shown conditions under which nonpara-
metric identi￿cation of additive and nonadditive marginal utility models of the
Tinbergen class is possible in a single hedonic market. These conditions depend
crucially on the assumption that @w
@z is known (or estimated from data on wages
and z). While this is true by de￿nition in the Tinbergen class of models studied
by Ekeland et al. and Heckman et al., in the uni￿ed economy, wages are given by
the unknown function w(z;t). Without further assumption, @w
@z is not identi￿ed
nonparametrically since for any value of t, the value of z is uniquely determined
by the mapping function z = z(t). This paper ￿rst shows in Lemma 4 that the
mapping function z(t) is identi￿ed nonparametrically using results from Matzkin
(2003). Lemma 4 generalizes Heckman et al.￿ s (2009) results to the uni￿ed hedonic
model. Using the identi￿cation result for z(t), this paper shows conditions under
which @w
@z is identi￿ed nonparametrically in Theorem 5. These conditions impose
shape restrictions on the production function p(z;t). In particular, the method
assumes that p(z;t) = q(z;t￿i) + r(ti) where r(:) is a known di⁄erentiable func-





i . A special case is met when ti is a pure preference attribute,
that is, ti a⁄ects utility but not productivity, i.e.
@p(z;t)
@ti = 0 for all z and ti. At-
tribute ti is an exclusion restriction in w(:;:) since it does not a⁄ect productivity
but not in z(t) since it matters for job satisfaction.
46The model is ￿ exible enough to allow the correlation between the contribution
of workers￿attributes to wages and that of jobs￿attributes to vary between -1
to 1. This correlation depends on preference parameters, technology parameters
and the distribution of workers and jobs￿attributes. The model therefore provides
an explanation for Abowd et al.￿ s (1999) puzzling ￿nding of a low or even nega-
tive correlation between workers￿and ￿rms￿￿xed-e⁄ects in wage regressions using
matched employer-employee data that does not require (large) frictions (Shimer,
2005). The key features of the uni￿ed hedonic model that makes this prediction
possible are: 1) that sorting occurs on both skills and preferences and 2) the generic
nonlinearity of the wage function (see Ekeland et al., 2004).
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50Appendix 1:

















Using the second order condition, we have
@z(to;tu)





0. The mapping function is strictly increasing in tu. Therefore, z(to;tu) is identi￿ed
using normalization results from Matzkin (2003) and assuming that to and tu are
independently distributed. Normalization is required since there exist monotonic
transformations g so that (g ￿ z;Ftu ￿ g￿1) and (z;Ftu), where Ftu is the CDF of
tu, generate the same data. However, one can show that z(to;tu) is identi￿ed non-
parametrically using a normalization (choosing one function g). One could either
normalize the distribution of tu (uniform for instance) or normalize the shape of
the function z(to;tu) by imposing z(t
o;tu) = tu for some t
o for instance.
Suppose that we assume a certain distribution on tu, so that Ftu is known, then
Fzjto=x(z) = Ftu(y) tells us that z(x;y) is the same quantile of the distribution of




Suppose instead that we normalize the mapping function so that for some t
o and
51all tu we have z(t
o;tu) = tu. We can then show that Ftu(tu) = Fzjto=t
o(z(t
o;tu)).
We therefore identify the distribution of tu from the distribution of z condi-
tional on to = t
o. The expression of the function z is now given by noting that
Fzjto(z(to;tu)) = Ftu(tu) = Fzjto=t
o(z(t
o;tu)). The ￿rst equality holds since z(to;tu)
is strictly increasing over tu and the second holds from the previous normalization.









The uni￿ed hedonic production economy model
Suppose that instead of being endowed with a machine, ￿rms can produce
their own machine. For instance, ￿rms could invest in less noisy machines, safer
machines, machines requiring less physical strength to operate, high-tech machines
etc. Suppose further that ￿rms are endowed with a vector of attributes y, y 2 Rny.
To ￿x ideas, these attributes could be related to investments capacities but also to
the managers￿attributes, again, either skills or preferences. Let fy(y) and Fy(y)
be the PDF and CDF of y respectively and let Fy be absolutely continuous with
respect to Lebesgue measure.
Let the costs of producing a machine with attributes z for a ￿rm with attributes
y be given by the twice di⁄erentiable continuous function c(y;z). It is still assumed
that to produce output each machine needs to be operated by one and only one
worker so that workers and ￿rms match one-to-one. The pro￿ts of a ￿rm with
attributes y producing output with machine z and employing worker t are now
given by:
r(z;t;y) = p(z;t) ￿ w(z;t) ￿ c(y;z)
53The ￿rst order condition to utility maximization is unchanged and given by
equation 1. We therefore have the mapping function z(t) indicating the optimal
machine demanded by a worker with attributes t when wage di⁄erential at z is
given by w. However, ￿rms are now maximizing pro￿ts by selecting the optimal

















Let t(z) denote the implicit function that solves Equation 24 for t given p(:;:)
and w(:;:). This function indicates the optimal worker t to select for a ￿rm supply-
ing machine with attributes z. Let z(y;t) denote the implicit function that solves
Equation 23 for z given p(:;:) and c(:;:) and w(:;:). This function indicates the
optimal machine z to supply for a ￿rm with attributes y employing worker with
attributes t. Substituting t(z) for t in z(y;t) we obtain an implicit function z(y)
indicating the optimal machine z￿ = z(y) to supply for a ￿rm with attributes y
given productivity p(:;:), costs c(:;:) and wage function w(:;:).
Assume further that the total surplus function s(z;t) ￿ p(z;t)￿c(y;z)￿j(z;t)
54satis￿es the generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition so that equilibrium is pure and
the mapping functions z(y) and t(z) are invertible. De￿ne these inverse functions
as y(z) and z(t) respectively. Workers￿demand for machines with attributes z is













￿dz. For an equilibrium to be reached, the supply of machines with
attributes z should be equal to workers￿demand for machines with attributes z
for all z. This means that:
ft(t(z))
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
@t(z)
@z
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿dz = fy(y(z))
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
@y(z)
@z
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿dz
Equilibrium will be reached by choosing the right shape for the function w and
in particular the right di⁄erentials at t and z. The equilibrium in this economy
is therefore characterized by a wage function w(z;t) and a mapping of workers￿
attributes onto jobs￿attributes t(z) and a mapping function of ￿rms attributes
onto jobs￿attributes and workers￿attributes y(z) so that i) supply equals demand
everywhere on the support of z ￿provided all workers and ￿rms receive more than
their reservation levels￿ , ii) workers maximize utility and iii) ￿rms maximize
pro￿ts (rents minus costs of producing z).
55Appendix 3:
Generalization to other markets
This paper relates to the general literature on hedonic models and not only
on that segment focussing on the labor market. For instance, Epple￿ s (1984)
extension of Tinbergen￿ s endowed economy to a production economy was originally
written in a consumer/producer context, not a worker/￿rm context. The classical
consumer/producer setting reads as follow.
There is a market for a good of attributes z and let p(z) be the hedonic equi-
librium price. Producers are endowed attributes y, y 2 Rny. To ￿x ideas, these
attributes could be related to investments capacities but also to the managers￿
attributes, again, either skills or preferences. Let fy(y) and Fy(y) be the PDF
and CDF of y respectively and let Fy be absolutely continuous with respect to
Lebesgue measure. Firms pro￿ts are given by p(z) ￿ c(z;y). Consumers are en-
dowed with attributes t, t 2 Rnt, that re￿ ect their preferences for the product.
Let ft(t) and Ft(t) be the PDF and CDF of t respectively and let Ft be absolutely
continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. Utility is given by k(z;t) ￿ p(z)
where k(z;t) is the indirect utility derived from consumption of z. In this classical
setting, output is either produced without labor input or, labor input belongs to y
and is ￿xed at the time ￿rms decide what z to produce. Firms choose to produce
the z that maximizes their pro￿ts and consumers/workers choose to consume the
56z that maximizes their utility.
An extension of the classical hedonic model related to the uni￿ed model outline
above would be to allow ￿rms to choose the type of worker to hire simultaneously
with their choice of z. Suppose that to produce a unit of good of quality z, ￿rms
need to hire one and only one worker, ￿say y is a machine that needs to be
operated by ￿xed quantity of workers, one and only one worker￿. Suppose that
the costs of producing z for a ￿rm y when employing worker with attributes t are
c(z;y;t). Pro￿ts for ￿rm y employing t to produce z are p(z) ￿ c(z;y;t) ￿ w(z;t)
where w(z;t) is the wage of worker t at job z. Suppose workers t derive indirect
disutility j(z0;t) while working at producing z0. Workers utility is then given by
k(z;t) ￿ j(z0;t) + w(z0;t) ￿ p(z).
In this economy, ￿rms/producers optimize on z and t0 and workers/consumers














Let z(y;t0) be the implicit function that solves Equation 25 for z the optimal
good to produce for ￿rm y with worker t0 and let t0(z;y) be the implicit function
57solving Equation 26 for t0 the optimal worker to hire for ￿rm y to produce z. Sub-
stituting t0(z;y) for t0 in z(y;t0) yields z(y) the optimal quality of good to produce
for a ￿rm with attributes y given production technology p(:;:), the equilibrium
wage function w(z;t) ￿the slopes￿ and the equilibrium price function p(z).











Let t(z) be the implicit function that solves Equation 27. This function indi-
cates the attributes of workers consuming good of quality z in equilibrium, given
product tastes k(:;:), and the equilibrium price function. Let z0(t) be the im-
plicit function that solves Equation 28. This function indicates the optimal job
to choose for workers with attributes t given job tastes j(:;:) and the equilibrium
wage function w(z;t).
In equilibrium, the worker that consumes good of quality z might not neces-
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































60Table 1: A calibration of the unidimensional quadratic-normal uni￿ed hedonic
model.
Parameters COV (p;#) COV (p;￿) COV (#;￿)
0:93 0:40 0:04
A 8:00
c 40:80
C ￿1:00
b 260:44
B ￿45:44
D 8:00
￿z 5:00
￿1 1:40
=> ￿t 9:80
￿z 0:15
￿0 ￿0:25
=> ￿t ￿0:04
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